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REASONABLENESS AND OBJECTIVITY
Neil MacCormick*
I. INTRODUCTION
Law and Objectivity' is a work of rare distinction. It accounts lu-
cidly for the elements of objectivity and of subjectivity in legal
thought, whether in relation to the elements required by the law for
liability, civil or criminal, or in relation to the objectivity, intersubjec-
tivity, or even pure subjectivity found in the weighing of legal argu-
ments. In relation to the former topic, Kent Greenawalt reminds us
that liability judged by the foresight of the reasonable person is objec-
tive, by contrast with liability grounded in the actual intentions of an
acting person.2 In relation to the latter, while he acknowledges a mea-
sure of objective rightness and wrongness and a considerable degree
of intersubjective checkability in the weighing and balancing of argu-
ments, he nevertheless concludes that, on any fine point of balancing,
reasonable people can differ. These differences are not objectively
corrigible. To that extent, there remains an element of apparently
irreducible subjectivity in the inevitable leeways of legal judgement.3
In deep respect for a distinguished colleague, whom it is a very
real honor to join in honoring, I should like to offer some thoughts
on the concept of the "reasonable" in response to the two points I
have just highlighted. On the latter in particular, now as in the past, I
find myself very much of the Greenawalt camp. In doing so, I am
partly restating and partly rethinking some ideas I published a few
years ago.4
From the beginnings of my study of law, I have been both fasci-
nated and troubled by the concept of the "reasonable" so frequently
used in such diverse contexts by lawyers and legislators in the legal
* Leverhulme Personal Research Professor and Regius Professor of Public Law,
University of Edinburgh.
I KENT GREENAWALT, LAw AND OBJEaCrVITY (1992).
2 See id& at 100-08.
3 See id at 216-28. I hope this is a reasonable summary of a careful and sensitive
argument.
4 See Neil MacCormick, On Reasonabeness, in LEs NOTIONS A CONTENU VARIABLE
EN Dgorr 131-56 (Ch. Perelman & Raymond Vander Elst eds., 1984).
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traditions with which I am most familiar. In the spectrum from purely
descriptive to purely evaluative, "reasonable" seems to belong more
toward the evaluative than the descriptive pole, not that there is no
element of the descriptive in it. If I say that the care manufacturers
took in manufacturing some article fell short of the care it would have
been reasonable for them to take in the given setting, I am not
describing the care they took or failed to take, I am evaluating the
care they took. I am comparing what was done with what could have
been done, and assessing whether a reasonable evaluation of the risks
would have left an actor in that situation satisfied with the degree of
care that was taken, or not so satisfied.
In my youth, evaluation of that sort seemed to me to involve a
high degree of subjectivity. Yet I found my elders and betters unani-
mous in the opinion that the standard in question was (as Greenawalt
also points out) an "objective" one. This puzzled me, and to some
extent still does. I am puzzled even though I know that there is no
strict contradiction between the two points in view. If a person is held
liable for failing to do what a reasonable person would have done in a
given context concerning a given misadventure that has occurred, we
all acknowledge that there need have been no real guilty intention on
the agent's part concerning the misadventure, no wilful intention to
bring it about. We are even ready to acknowledge that there need
have been no real fault on the agent's part, for he may have been
striving to the best of weak abilities to prevent the accident that hap-
pened. The point is that a common standard is set for all persons,
and all must meet that standard or be held liable in the event of mis-
haps occurring. And this may well be fairer from the point of view of
accident victims, so far as concerns compensation, than any attempt to
grade fault according to the different capabilities of different actors.5
Clearly enough, this is, from the duty-bearer's point of view, some-
thing other than a subjective standard of achievement. The law's ex-
hortation is not simply to do your best or to avoid acting with evil
intentions toward others; it is to act according to the common stan-
dard of the community, as a "reasonable person" would.
That standard could be objective vis-A-vis the acting subject, and
yet have to be applied only as mediated through the subjectivity of the
judge who decides after the fact whether reasonable care was shown.
There is nothing a bit surprising in the thought that objective stan-
dards are applicable only through adjudicative subjectivity. It is an
5 See Neil MacCormick, The Obligation of Reparation, in NEIL MAcCORmicK, LEGAL
RIGHT AND SocIAL DEMOCRACG. ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
212-31(1982).
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objective question as to who crossed the line first, but it has to be
judged by the linejudge, the photo-finish adjudicator, or the like.
But by reference to Greenawalt's second point which was cited
above, it seems that it is not just the necessary subjectivity of apprecia-
tion that is engaged here, but something in the very idea of the rea-
sonable that calls for a weighing of more than one factor, more than
one variable. There may then only be limited intersubjective control-
lability in evaluation, even when everyone acts in the best of good
faith and tries to judge the matter fairly and correctly. Is there really
an "objective" answer to the question when this "objective" criterion of
liability is satisfied?
Turning now to proceed with the inquiry, I want at once to abjure
any narrowness of concern, as though reasonableness were in issue
only in tort law, important though that is as one context for deploying
it in the law. For there are many legal settings in which the question
arises of what it is reasonable to do, to say, to conclude, or to doubt in
a given context. A value like "reasonable" may be very context-sensi-
tive, and always the judgement is going to be a concrete one in a con-
crete context, as the late Chaim Perelman was wont to stress. 6 As we
shall see, there may be many factors which in any given situation have
to be considered and assessed in judging the reasonableness of an act
or an omission to act or a decision in its concrete context. For this
reason and in this sense, "reasonableness" taken out of context is what
Julius Stone called a "legal category of indeterminate reference."7
Whether or not it remains quite as indeterminate in context is less
clear. Anyvay, when we think of legal reasoning in the common law
systems or in mixed systems such as Scots law, the category of the rea-
sonable has great importance and many uses. The same, no doubt, is
true of civilian legal systems also. In many branches of the law, "rea-
sonableness" is the standard set by the operative principles and rules
of conduct and of judgement, as we may see from the following
illustrations.
6 See CH. PEP.LmAN, L'EMPIP RHETORIQUE: RHETORIoUE ET ARGUMENTATION 40
(1977) ("En fait, ces valeurs font l'objet d'un accord universel dans la mesure oi elles
restent indetermin~es; ds qu'on tente de les pr~ciser, en les appliquant a une situa-
tion, ou A une action concrete, les desaccords... ne tardent pas a se manifester.").
For the English translation, see CH. PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC 27 (William
Kluback trans., 1982) ("These values are the object of a universal agreement as long
as they remain undetermined. When one tries to make them precise, applying them
to a situation or to a concrete action, disagreements ... are not long in coming.").
7 JuLIus STONE, LEGAL SYSrEM AND LAWYERs' REASONINGS 263-67, 301-37 (1964).
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Within public law, it is a general principle that the powers of pub-
lic authorities must not be exercised unreasonably.8 Within the crimi-
nal law, the standard required in trials for the proof of an accused
person's guilt is proof "beyond a reasonable doubt," this being a more
exacting standard of proof than the proof "on balance of probabili-
ties" required in most issues of civil litigation.9 In the private law of
reparation of injuries, the standard of care which each person owes to
every other is the care which a "reasonable man" would take for the
safety of his neighbours in the given circumstances.10 The extent of
liability for negligent wrongdoing is likewise limited by the conse-
quences of a course of conduct so far as, at the time of action, these
would have been foreseeable by a reasonable person.'1 This duty of
reasonable care, although originally elaborated in the jurisprudence
of the higher courts, is now also confirmed in certain more particular
instances by statutory law.12 In the law of contract, there is a general
common law principle under which contracts in restraint of trade are
invalid if they set restraints which go beyond what is reasonable in the
interest of the parties and in the public interest.13 Furthermore, dam-
ages for breach of contract are restricted to losses reasonably foresee-
8 See Westminster Corp. v. London & N.W. Ry. Co. [1905] App. Cas. 426, 430
(appeal taken from Eng.). Lord Macnaghten noted,
"[A] public body invested with statutory powers ... must take care not to
exceed or abuse its powers. It must keep within the limits of the authority
committed to it. It must act in good faith. And it must act reasonably. The
last proposition is involved in the second, if not in the first."
Id. (quoting Lord Macnaghten).
Some commentators have doubted the utility of this wide sense of reasonable-
ness. See STANLEY A. DE SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 346-54
(J.M. Evans ed., 4th ed. 1980).
9 See COLIN TAPPER, CROSS AND TAPPER ON EVIDENCE 162-63 (8th ed. 1995).
Some Englishjudges have tended to discourage the "reasonable doubt" formula, but
the Scots have held to it. See ALLAN GRIERSON WALKER & NORMAN MACDONALD LOCK-
HART WALKER, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN SCOTLAND (1964) (noting chapters seven and
eight, and especially page 76). At page seventy-six, the authors state: "It is for the
Crown to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt .... The doubt must be
reasonable in that it must not be a strained or fanciful acceptance of remote possibili-
ties." Id. at 76; see also Shaw v. H.M. Advocate, 1953 J.C. 51.
10 See, e.g., Donoghue V. Stevenson, [1932] App. Cas. 562 (appeal taken from
Scot.). "Reasonable man" is gradually giving way to "reasonable person," and this is
much to be welcomed. See Greenawalt's wise words in GREENAWALT, supra note 1, at
145-46.
11 See, e.g., Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co. (The
Wagon Mound), [1961] App. Cas. 388 (P.C.) (appeal taken from N.S.W.).
12 See, e.g., Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 31 (Eng.); Occupiers'
Liability (Scotland) Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, ch. 31 (Scot.).
13 SeeJ.D. HEYDON, THE RESTRAINT OF TRADE DoGRINE (1971).
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able as of the date of contracting, and there are other instances where
rules of statutory law enable courts to set aside contractual provisions
which are unreasonable.' 4 In relatively recent divorce law, we find
provisions whereby unreasonable conduct by one spouse towards the
other may be a ground for judicial dissolution of marriage.' 5
As everyone is well aware, these are merely illustrations of a very
general tendency in the law to rely upon the standard of reasonable-
ness as a criterion of right decisionmaking, of right action, and of fair
interpersonal relationships within the law of property, the law of obli-
gations, and family law. Even as a few illustrative examples, they suf-
fice to ground the thesis that reasoning about reasonableness is a
matter of great moment within the operations of the law. If we did
not understand how to work with such a notion, we would fail to un-
derstand an essential and central feature of contemporary legal rea-
soning. How then are we to understand it?
The first point to make is that the "reasonableness" the law has in
view must be practical reasonableness,' 6 not an abstract capacity for
reason upon theoretical issues. The reasonable person has the virtue
of prudentia and uses this in action. It is a virtue that is incompatible
with fanaticism or apathy, but holds a mean between these, as it does
between excessive caution and excessive indifference to risk. Reason-
able people take account of foreseeable risks, but with regard to seri-
ous possibilities or probabilities, not remote or fanciful chances. They
do not jump to conclusions, but consider the evidence and take ac-
count of different points of view. They are aware that any practical
dilemma may involve a meeting point of different values and interests,
and they take the competing and converging values seriously, seeking
a reconciliation of them or, in cases of inevitable conflict, acting for
whatever are the weightier or the overriding values.
Reasonable persons resemble Adam Smith's "impartial specta-
tor."' 7 (Indeed, it might be better to say that they themselves exhibit
14 See, ag., Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, ch. 50 (U.K.).
15 See Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, ch. 18, § 1 (2) (b); Divorce (Scotland) Act,
1976, ch. 39, § 1(2) (b).
16 In what follows, I am profoundly indebted, not only to Greenawalt, see GREENA-
WALT, supra note 1, but also, and even more, to John Finnis, seeJoHN FINNIs, NATURAL
LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 100-33 (1993), though in relying as I do on Adam Smith
and Robert Alexy, I fall well short of Thomistic value-realism.
17 See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 129-37 (D.D. Raphael &
A-L. MacFie eds., 1976); Cf KNUD HAAKONSSEN, THE SCIENCE OF A LEGISLATOR: THE
NATURALJURISPRUDENE OF DAVID HuMEAND ANDAM SMrrH 47-52 (1981). I have never
found myself persuaded by the "rational choice" version of reasonableness that
prevails in the contemporary "economic analysis of law" and commend economists to
other aspects of Adam Smith's thought. I gratefully endorse the argument of Heidi Li
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recourse to "spectator" reasoning.) For they seek to abstract from
their own position to see and feel the situation as it looks and feels to
others involved, and they weigh impartially their own interests and
commitments in comparison with those of others. They are aware
that there are different ways in which things, activities, and relation-
ships can have value to people, and that all values ought to be given
some attention, even though it is not possible to bring all to realisa-
tion in any one life, or project, or context of action. Hence they seek
to strike a balance that takes account of this apparently irreducible
plurality of values. In this way reasonable people are objective: they
are not so consumed with passion for their own interest or project
(though they may indeed be very committed to it) as to be unable to
stand back momentarily and see the situation from other persons'
points of view. Having done that, they are able to judge their own
interests in competition with others' in an at least partly objective way.
They will recognise that a greater interest or deeper value of another
can properly take priority over the interest they pursue and the values
they seek to realise, so far as conflict is inevitable. Reasonable people
cultivate the Smithian virtue of self-command and apply it in self-re-
straint when others have legitimate priority over them.
Perfectly reasonable people would doubtless be unreal paragons
of virtue. There are few to be found. Ordinary people are not; but
most are reasonable some of the time and some are reasonable most
of the time. And on all of us the law imposes the requirement that we
act reasonably or, at any rate, act, whether by luck or by judgement,
up to the standard of the reasonable in a variety of settings such as
those noted. But contexts differ. As a juror in a criminal trial, I must
look at the prosecution evidence with a critical eye, especially having
regard to any competing evidence offered by the defence, and consid-
ering whatever grounds of doubt have been put before me by the de-
fence. Certainty is impossible in relation to contingent assertions
about the past, such as are involved in every criminal trial. Some
doubt (or possibility of doubt) must always be present, but not all
doubt rises above the threshold of doubt that a reasonable person
would act on. Some points of doubt are properly ignored or treated
as remote and unrealistic, fanciful, even, set against a powerful weight
of credible evidence. As an administrative decisionmaker, I must be
careful to review the whole scheme within which I exercise discretion
and be sure to ground my decision on a weighing only of factors rele-
vant to the scheme, taking no note of irrelevant matters. As a driver, I
Feldman. See Heidi Li Feldman, Science, Reason, and Tort Law: Looking for the Reason-
able Person, 1 CuRRENT LEGAL IssuEs 35, 39-43 (1998).
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must always bear in mind that, however pressing my reasons for haste
may be, and whatever burdens of worry and concern beset me, there
are other road-users whose safety in life and limb ranks higher on a
just scale of value than my urgent need to keep an appointment. And
so on. Reasonable doubt is not the same as reasonable decisionmak-
ing nor is either the same as reasonable care in driving. But there is a
common thread that links the appellation "reasonable" in these and
other instances of its use. That common thread, I would submit, lies
in the style of deliberation a person would ideally engage in, and the
impartial attention he would give to competing values and evidences
in the given concrete setting. The ideal deliberator is the "reasonable
person," and actual human agents achieve reasonableness to the ex-
tent that their decisions or actions or conclusions match those that
would result from ideal deliberation. Naturally, where issues arise for
decision in a court after the fact that gives rise to criminal charge or
asserted civil liability, the court's deliberation, the heat of the moment
being long past, can more probably replicate the ideal deliberation
than can the individual human response to the heated moment.
It is a common saying that there are many questions on which
reasonable people can reasonably differ. Some of these are simple
differences of personal taste-baseball is for one person a more excit-
ing game than cricket, but another prefers cricket for the long, slow
build up of expectation and tension by contrast with the more explo-
sive action in the baseball game. De gustibus non est disputandum; it is
foolish to treat differences of taste as occasions for disputation. But
this is- not the only kind of difference there is. In any question that
involves weighing much evidence or many interests and values and
coming to a conclusion on what may seem a relatively fine balance, it
does not surprise us to find others reaching a conclusion different
from our own. There can here be a real difference of judgement
about what is right and what ought accordingly be done. Such a dif-
ference ofjudgement is no mere difference of taste. And it matters to
us, because a decision must be made according to one or the other
view, whereas in most differences of taste it is sufficient for different
persons each to go his own way. Such differences of judgement, as
Greenawalt notes, are typical of so-called "hard cases" as these have
been discussed in the jurisprudence of the last thirty years.' 8
The problem may have to do with the "procedural"19 character of
reasonable deliberation. In the light of human values, interests, and
18 See GREENAWALT, Supra note 1, at 207-31.
19 See ROBERT AI.xY, A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION: THE THEORY OF RA-
TIONAL DISCOURSE AS THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 177-208 (Ruth Adler & Neil
1999]
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purposes, one must consider all that is relevant, and assume an impar-
tial stance in assigning relative weight or importance to different con-
textually relevant values or interests. But different people may differ
in how exactly they assign such weights and carry out balancing.
There may be obvious errors of partiality or gross anomalies in differ-
ential weighting, but beyond that, it is difficult or impossible to show
that one approach is superior to another. Provided people avoid fick-
leness or capriciousness and observe a decent constancy in judgement
over time, while remaining open to revision of their opinion in the
light of reasoned arguments, they are not unreasonable just because
they take a view different from mine or yours.
It follows that on some questions, or in relation to some deci-
sions, there may be more than one reasonable answer or, at least, a
range of answers that cannot be shown to be, or dismissed as, unrea-
sonable. That is compatible with the fact that those who hold to any
of the reasonable answers can readily dismiss other approaches, on
good grounds, as unreasonable ones. The absence of a single reason-
able answer is not proof that there is no such thing as an unreasona-
ble one. This is itself strongly persuasive in favour of establishing
authorities charged with decisionmaking. Provided those holding au-
thority are wise and reasonable persons, and provided there is some
way of controlling or checking their decisions (e.g., by appeal, or by
answerability before some representative body, or the like), there
seems to be no better way than this of dealing with the problem of the
nonunivocality of the reasonable. It is not surprising that constitu-
tional states are marked by the practice of appointing decisionmakers
to exercise restricted discretions by the use of proper procedures.
Sometimes, moreover, to ensure the discursive and deliberative qual-
ity of the search for final decision or answer, authority is granted to a
group, committee, assembly, or bench of several persons; and then
there have to be voting procedures to make possible final decisions on
finely balanced questions. Again, this is an unsurprising feature of
contemporary constitutional landscapes.
These reflections may suffice by way of an introductory attempt to
analyse and to flesh out in general terms an understanding of the idea
of the "reasonable." Next, I wish to pursue this in relation to positive
law, to check how far the ideas put forward here find illustration, if
not proof, in the materials of the law. I shall do this in three stages,
considering first the reasons that might be advanced to justify use of
the standard of reasonableness in law, second the ways there are of
MacCormick trans., 1988). Alexy's proceduralist approach follows, but refines, that of
Jfirgen Habermas.
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interpreting the factors relevant to reasonableness in different
branches of the law, and finally concrete decisions about reasonable-
ness where what is reasonable is (sometimes, at least) said to be a
"question of fact."
II. WHY "RFASONABLENESS"?
There has been a fair amount of writing on whatjustifies the law's
resort to prescribing "reasonableness" as a guiding standard in a given
general context. Early in the field was H.LA. Hart's discussion of the
reasons that sometimes militate against a legislative strategy of laying
down specific and detailed rules of conduct. "Sometimes," he says,
"the sphere to be legally controlled is recognized... as one in which
the features of individual cases will vary so much in socially important
but unpredictable respects, that uniform rules to be applied from case
to case without further official direction cannot usefully be framed by
the legislature in advance."20 In such a case, suggests Hart, a legisla-
ture may prescribe general principles and set up a subordinate
rulemaking authority to issue by way of delegated legislation more
specific rules for the guidance of the general public or some section
thereof.2 ' Alternatively, it may resort to the "similar technique" of re-
quiring persons in general "to conform to a variable standard before it
has been officially defined .... "22 In this case "they may learn from a
court only ex post facto when they have violated it, what, in terms of
specific actions or forbearances, is the standard required of them. '23
The prime example in Hart's view of such a "variable standard" in
Anglo-American law is the standard of reasonable care as it applies in
the civil and criminal law for defining actionable or punishable forms
of negligence. 24
This way of depicting recourse to the "reasonable" as an operative
standard in law assimilates it to delegated legislation. The law as it
leaves the legislator's hand is incomplete, and it falls to the judge who
applies the law to supply a more detailed rule within the partially in-
complete framework laid down. Hence the judge participates in the
legislative process in a subordinate way, exercising the kind of strong
discretion legislatures have in liberal democracies.
In the light of our introductory discussion of reasonableness, this
seems to exaggerate the purely decisionist element in judgement con-
20 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127 (1961).
21 See idt at 127-28.
22 Id at 128-29.
23 Id at 129.
24 See id-
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cerning the reasonable. There must indeed be a decision after a bal-
ancing of relevant considerations, but this really is a kind of judging,
not a kind of legislating. A scintilla of evidence in favour of the pres-
ent view against Hart's is that Hart's clashes with the lawyers' view (dis-
cussed further below) that what is reasonable in any case is a "question
of fact." Moreover, it fails to square with the possibility that lay per-
sons and businesses can perfectly well guide their own conduct with
some confidence by reference to such guidelines as "reasonable care,"
"reasonable notice," and "reasonable conformity of goods to sample."
They can do so without waiting for decisions to be laid down by the
authorities. But that is what must often be done when delegated legis-
lation is awaited to complete an imperfect statutory scheme.
To say this is to pick up a point from Ronald Dworkin's critique
of the theory of "strong discretion" to which he considers Hart com-
mitted.25 Dworkin considers Hart's whole approach to be vitiated
through ignoring the role principles play in interaction with rules,
with the upshot that concrete legal questions always involve appraisal
of the overall balance in a constellation of principles as one interprets
a legal problem involving the contested application of rules to facts. 26
Rules that incorporate standards, he suggests, function much as do
principles, in that they call for a measure of balancing.27
As will be seen in what follows, I agree with Dworkin in rejecting
the "delegated legislation" model, though I do not accept the full im-
plications of Dworkinian interpretivism. Nevertheless, we can take up
some of what Hart says. As he points out, we face a standing possibility
of conflicts of interests or of values; the case of negligence in tort law
is a case in point.28 On the one hand, we set value upon the security
of persons and their property and their economic interests from dam-
age resulting from others' acts. 29 On this account, we think it right
and proper that each person take care to avoid inflicting bodily harm
on others or damaging their property or economic well-being. On the
other hand, we set value upon the freedom of individuals to pursue
their own activities and way of life without having to undertake an
intolerable burden of precautions against the risks of damage to
others. 30 The law has to express a balance between these values in
25 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-45 (1978) [hereinafter
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]; see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 280-82
(1986).
26 See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 25, at 44.
27 See id. at 43-45.
28 See HART supra note 20, at 129-30.
29 See id.
30 See id.
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general terms, and it expresses this balance by prescribing that such
care has to be taken as would be taken by a reasonable and prudent
person. Butjust as this implies in general terms the striking of a bal-
ance between the two values of relative security from harm and rela-
tive liberty to do as you like, so it points in particular situations to a
balancing of relevant values in their particular manifestations.
Judicial dicta are readily available to back this up. In Read v. J.
Lyons & Co.,31 the plaintiff, a government inspector working in a
munitions factory in wartime, was injured by an explosion in the shell-
filling shop of the factory. She sued for damages, arguing that the
factory proprietor was subject to Rylands v. Fletcher32 strict liability, and
accordingly that she was entitled to compensation without proof of
any fault in the conduct of the operations of manufacturing shells.
The House of Lords rejected this argument. Lord Macmillan stressed,
The process of evolution [of English law] has been from the princi-
ple that every man acts at his peril and is liable for all the conse-
quences of his acts to the principle that a man's freedom of action is
subject only to the obligation not to infringe any duty of care he
owes to others.33
In the particular case, indeed, it was argued that an exception to the
modem principle existed in the case of "things and operations dan-
gerous in themselves," but as to this Lord Macmillan observed,
[I] n the case of dangerous things and operations the law has recog-
nized that a special responsibility exists to take care. But I do not
think that it has ever been laid down that there is absolute liability
apart from negligence where persons are injured in consequence of
the use of such things or the conduct of such operations. In truth it
is a matter of degree. Every activity in which man engages is fraught
with some possible element of danger to others. Experience shows
that even from acts apparently innocuous injury to others may re-
sult. The more dangerous the act the greater is the care that must
be taken in performing it.34
Here is a pretty straightforward judicial exposition both of the stan-
dard argument in favour of upholding a requirement of "reasonable
care" rather than "strict liability" and of the argument acknowledging
that the degree of care required as "reasonable" must vary according
to the risks at stake. This is indeed "a matter of degree." Since no
legislature either can or should try to foresee all particular situations
31 [1947] App. Cas. 156 (appeal taken from Eng.).
32 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (1868).
33 Read, [1947] App. Cas. at 171.
34 Id. at 172.
1999] 1585
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
of risk, it neither can nor should seek to make for all purposes de-
tailed rules about precautions to be taken. It is sufficient that the law
prescribe the standard of care as that which is reasonable, and defer
the evaluation of particular risks to particular cases.
Still, the question of reasonableness as a matter of due care in the
law of civil liability for harm negligently caused is merely one illustra-
tion of the general point. It can be made no less vividly with regard to
the use of "reasonableness" in public law as a criterion for good deci-
sionmaking by public authorities. One can summarise, and inevitably
oversimplify, the relevant body of law35 as follows. Every public power
of decisionmaking, whether judicial, quasijudicial, or administrative,
must be exercised reasonably, that is, with proper regard to relevant
considerations, and without any regard to irrelevant considerations.3 6
The test of relevance in this case is governed by the terms in which
and the objects for which the power of decisionmaking is granted by
law.37 Provided that the decisionmaker has grounded his decision
upon a general appraisal of all the relevant factors and has not acted
upon any irrelevant considerations, the decision cannot be quashed
by the courts merely on the ground that it is erroneous "upon the
merits." Only if the decision is one that no reasonable person could
have reached upon any reasonable evaluation of the relevant factors,
may the decision be reviewed and quashed in a court.38
Again, what justifies resort to the requirement of reasonableness
is the existence of a plurality of factors that must be evaluated in re-
spect of their relevance to a common focus of concern (in this case a
decision to be made by a public body for public purposes). Unreason-
ableness consists in ignoring some relevant factor or factors, in treat-
ing as relevant what ought to be ignored. Alternatively, it may involve
some gross distortion of the relative values of different factors. Even
though different people can come to different evaluations in such
questions of balance, and a variety of evaluations could be accepted as
falling within the range of reasonable opinions about that balance,
35 See Lord Irvine of Lairg, Q.C., Judges and Decision-Makes: The Theory and Practice
ofWednesbury Review, 1996 PUB. L. 59.
36 See, e.g., Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Comm'n, [1969] 2 App. Cas. 147
(appeal taken from Eng.).
37 See, e.g., Padfield v. Minister of Agric., [1968] App. Cas. 997 (appeal taken from
Eng.).
38 See, e.g., Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. V. Wednesbury Corp.,
[1948) 1 K.B. 223 (Eng. C.A.); Secretary of State for Educ. & Science v. Tameside
Metro. Borough Council, [1977] 1 App. Cas. 1014 (appeal taken from Eng.); Malloch
v. Aberdeen Corp. (No. 2), 1974 S.L.T. 253.
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the range has some limits. Some opinions are so eccentric or idiosyn-
cratic that they are not accepted as valid judgements at all.
As Kent Greenawalt and Duncan Kennedy have shown,3 9 what is
presupposed in any resort to reasonableness as a standard is that there
is some topic or focus of concern to which, in accordance with varia-
ble circumstances, various factors are relevant, these having to be set
in an overall balance of values one way or the other. Kennedy ob-
serves that legal standards typically embody a relatively specific subset
of social values, and one would be inclined to concur for values like
"fairness," "due care," "due process," "natural justice," or the like. 40
But in the case of the "reasonable," there is not the same degree of
localisation of values. What is reasonable in the particular circum-
stances depends upon an evaluation of the competing factors of deci-
sion, and what factors of decision are relevant (and thus in
competition) is highly context-dependent. The very thing that justi-
fies the law's recourse to such a complex standard as reasonableness
in the formulation of principles or rules for the guidance of officials
or citizens is the existence of topics or foci of concern to which a
plurality of value-laden factors is relevant in a context-dependent way.
III. INTERPRET NG "REASONABLENESS"
There must be at least two ranges of variation within the variables
to which any question of reasonableness relates. The topics to which
reasonableness connects are variable, and the factors relevant to
judgement vary according to the topic. The topic, as noted several
times already, may be decisions by public authorities, or decisions
about guilt in criminal trials, or activities of persons which are poten-
tially harmful to other individuals, or contractual relationships, or
marital relationships, or any of many others determined by legislators
or judges.
Given this variability of topic, there are necessarily certain ques-
tions about reasonableness which are pure questions of law, that is, of
the proper interpretation of the law. What are properly to be treated
as the factors and values relevant to a given topic? That is a question
of the correct interpretation of the law as it bears upon the topic. It is
quite common that statutes prescribing a standard of reasonableness
explicitly indicate relevant factors. Thus, for example, the 1957 Oc-
cupiers' Liability Act requires that every occupier of premises "take
39 See GREENAWALT, supra note 1, at 144-45 (quoting Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685, 1688 (1976)); see also
DuNcAN KENNEDY, A CRmQUE OF ADJuDICATION: Fin de Sicle 139 (1997).
40 See Kennedy, supra note 39, at 1688.
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such care as in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable to see
that the visitor will be reasonably safe in using the premises for the
purposes for which he is invited or permitted by the occupier to be
there."41 Then the Act further provides as follows:
The circumstances relevant for the present purpose include the de-
gree of care, and of want of care, which would ordinarily be looked
for in such a visitor, so that (for example) in proper cases-
(a) an occupier must be prepared for children to be less care-
ful than adults; and
(b) an occupier may expect that a person, in the exercise of
his calling, will appreciate and guard against any special
risks ordinarily incident to it, so far as the occupier leaves
him free to do so.
42
Again, the 1977 Unfair Contract Terms Act 43 makes provision
whereby the courts can control exemption clauses in contracts be-
tween suppliers and consumers of goods and services. Any contrac-
tual term which seeks to exempt a party from his normal legal
liabilities may be struck down if it is not reasonable, as to which the
Act makes the following further provision: "In determining . . .
whether a contract term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness,
regard shall be had in particular to the matters specified in Schedule
2 to this Act."44 Schedule 2 provides that "regard is to be had in par-
ticular [to] .. . any of the following [matters] which appear to be
relevant": 45
(a) the strength of the bargaining positions of the parties rela-
tive to each other, taking into account (among other
things) alternative means by which the customer's require-
ments could be met;
(b) whether the customer received an inducement to agree to
the term, or, in accepting it, had an opportunity of enter-
ing into a similar contract with other persons, but without
having to accept a similar term;
(c) whether the customer knew or ought reasonably to have
known of the existence and extent of the term (having re-
gard, among other things, to any custom of the trade and
any previous course of dealing between the parties);
(d) where the term excludes or restricts any relevant liability if
some condition is not complied with, whether it was rea-
41 Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 31, § 2(2) (Eng.).
42 Id. at § 2(3).
43 Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, ch. 50 (Eng.).
44 Id at ch. 50, § 11 (2).
45 Id. at ch. 50, § 11 (2), sched. 2.
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sonable at the time to expect that compliance with that
condition would be practicable;
(e) whether the goods were manufactured, processed or
adapted to the special order of the customer.46
In both the instances quoted, the legislature has given explicit, but
nonexclusive guidance as to factors which are relevant to ajudgement
of reasonableness in respect of the topic in question. Similar attempts
to give a partial definition of factors relevant to judgements about rea-
sonableness in particular contexts are commonly and regularly to be
found in judicial dicta. The High Court of Australia has attempted to
clarify the extent of the duty to take reasonable care in giving informa-
tion or advice, the following being a useful dictum by Chief Justice
Gibbs:
It would appear to accord with general principle that a person
should be under no duty to take reasonable care that advice or in-
formation which he gives to another is correct, unless he knows, or
ought to know, that the other relies on him to take such reasonable
care and may act in reliance on the advice or information which he
is given, and unless it would be reasonable for that other person so
to rely and act. It would not be reasonable to act in reliance on
advice or information given casually on some social or informal oc-
casion or, generally speaking, unless the advice or information con-
cerned "a business or professional transaction whose nature makes
clear the gravity of the inquiry and the importance and influence
attached to the answer . ...-47
In this case of Shaddock & Associates v. Parramatta City Counci4 the
High Court was deciding whether to override a restriction upon the
range of liability for negligent misstatements established by the Judi-
cial Committee of the Privy Council in an earlier Australian case, 48 in
which the class of persons that would have a duty of care would be
those persons who have, or hold themselves out as having, profes-
sional skills, and who give advice regarding those skills. As Justice Ma-
son observed in the Shaddock case, 49 the justifying ground for such a
restriction is some such policy ground as that indicated in the Ameri-
can Restatement (Second) of Torts, namely that: "[w] hen the harm that is
46 I&
47 Shaddock & Assoc. Proprietary, Ltd. v. Parramatta City Council, (1981) 150
C.L.R. 225, 231 (quoting Lord Pearce in Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners,
[1964] App. Cas. 465, 539 (appeal taken from Eng.)). Compare with Caparo Indus. v.
Dickman, [1990] 1 All E.R. 568, 574 (opinion by Lord Bridge of Harwich).
48 See Mutual Life & Citizens' Assurance Co. v. Evatt, [1971] App. Cas. 793 (ap-
peal taken from Eng.).
49 See Shaddock, (1981) 150 C.L.R. at 249-50.
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caused is only pecuniary loss, the courts have found it necessary to
adopt a more restricted rule of liability, because of the extent to which
misinformation may be, and may be expected to be, circulated, and
the magnitude of the losses which may follow from reliance on it. "5°
ButJustice Mason rejected this as sufficientjustification for the restric-
tion envisaged, because:
In the first place, it denies a remedy to those who sustain serious
loss at the hands of those who are not members of the class and
whose conduct is negligent. Secondly, it ignores the availability of
insurance as a protection against liability. Thirdly, there is no logic
in excluding from the class of persons liable for negligent mis-state-
ment persons who, though they may not exercise skill and compe-
tence, assume a responsibility to give advice or information to
others on serious matters which may occasion loss or damage. Fi-
nally, the rule, recently established by Caltex Oil (Australia) Pry. Ltd.
v. The Dredge "Willemstad" (1976)136 C.L.R. 529, is that economic
loss, not consequential upon property damage, may be recoverable
from those whose negligence occasions it.5 1
Here we have, in small bulk, what I have elsewhere 52 argued to be a
characteristic mode of common law argumentation. In arguing in fa-
vour both of the more extended interpretation of "reasonable reli-
ance" and thus of the more extensive view of liability for negligent
misstatement, Justice Mason is advancing in his first and second points
consequentialist grounds for favouring the given interpretation, and
in his third and fourth points arguments of coherence.
Nor is this an unusual feature of such arguments concerning the
interpretation of what is reasonable. Consider the New York case of
American Book Co. v. Yeshiva University Development Foundation, Inc.53
concerning the interpretation of a covenant in a lease under which
the tenant of commercial premises was restricted from subletting the
premises without the written consent of the landlord, such consent
not to be "unreasonably withheld." American Book Company wished
to sublet to an organisation called "Planned Parenthood Federation
of America. '54 Yeshiva University, as successor in tire to the landlord
with whom the lease had originally been made, withheld consent on
the ground of "philosophical and ideological 'inconsistencies' be-
tween itself and the proposed subtenant, [and] the 'controversial' na-
50 Id. at 250 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. a (1977)).
51 Id. at 250-51.
52 See NEIL MAcCoRmIcK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 100-51 (rev. ed.
1994).
53 297 N.Y.S. 2d 156 (1969).
54 See id. at 158.
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ture of the subtenant."5 5 (The controversial nature in question was
Planned Parenthood's character as a propagandist for contraception.)
Judge Greenfield ruled that only "objective" grounds for refusal of
consent were acceptable as grounds for "reasonable" refusal, that is,
[s] tandards which are readily measurable criteria of proposed sub-
tenant's or assignee's acceptability from the point of view of any
landlord:
(a) financial responsibility; (b) the "identity" or "business char-
acter" of the subtenant-i.e., his suitability for the particular build-
ing; (c) the legality of the proposed use; (d) the nature of the
occupancy-i.e., office, factory, clinic or whatever.
56
This denied recourse to "subjective" grounds of objection based on
the particular likes and dislikes or philosophical, religious, or ideolog-
ical convictions of the landlord. For the learned judge's ruling on the
interpretation of "reasonableness" as here implying an objective stan-
dard, we find very characteristic reasoning pointing to the inexpedi-
ent and unjust consequences of adopting the subjective standard:
If indeed the potentiality for controversy were a serviceable stan-
dard for measuring the acceptability of a subtenancy, many of our
most socially useful institutions would be homeless vagrants on the
streets, and our buildings would be tenanted by bland, unexception-
able models of propriety and dullness. Even proponents of unpop-
ular ideas are entitled to a roof over their heads.
57
The point just considered deals with one of the most important gen-
eral aspects of the interpretation of "reasonableness" as a standard,
namely its typically objective character, to which we have already al-
luded. Even here, though, the question can sometimes be an open
one whether, for a given topic, the reasonable has to be construed as
that which is objectively reasonable, without regard to personal pecu-
liarities or predilections of individuals in a particular relationship.
Cannot "reasonable" signify what is subjectively reasonable, reason-
able for a particular individual in a particular setting?
On grounds which have been classically expressed by Justice
Holmes5 8 and by Lord Reid,5 9 the ordinary presumption is that the
test of reasonableness is, in the sense indicated, an objective test. The
rights of persons against others in society ought to be fixed by com-
55 Id. at 159.
56 Id. at 159-60.
57 Id. at 162.
58 See OLIvER WaDELL HOLMES, JR., ThE COMMON LAw 88-89 (Mark DeWolfe
Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
59 See Lord Reid, The Law and the Reasonable Man, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRmsH
ACADEMY, 1968, at 189, 200-01.
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mon intersubjective criteria, not by reference to particular peculiari-
ties of individuals. At least in all matters affecting the rights of
persons in civil law or in public law, there should normally be an ob-
jective grounding of the rights established. On the other hand, as
Lord Reid once pointed out, 60 in matters of criminal liability, at least
for serious crimes, we should always apply a very strong presumption
in favour of subjective mens rea or at least subjective culpability on the
part of the person accused.
Once we see the matter in this light we can, however, see ground
for a different judgement in such an area as family law, given the in-
tensely personal quality of relationships (e.g., between spouses). Lord
Reid himself once remarked that "[i]n matrimonial cases we are not
concerned with the reasonable man, as we are in cases of negligence.
We are dealing with this man and this woman and the fewer a priori
assumptions we make about them the better."61 This statement was in
turn adopted by the Court of Appeal in England in ruling on the
proper interpretation of the "reasonable" in the context of divorce
law. The statute provided that divorce might be granted if a marriage
had irretrievably broken down on the ground that, inter alia, one
spouse behaved toward the other in such a way that the other "cannot
reasonably be expected" to go on living with this spouse. The test to
be applied must take account of the subjective propensities and char-
acters of the two individuals in the relationship of marriage:
Would any right-thinking person come to the conclusion that this
husband has behaved in such a way that this wife cannot reasonably
be expected to live with him, taking into account the whole of the
circumstances and the characters and personalities of the parties? 62
This stress on the subjectivity of the spouses, and the related subjectiv-
ity of the test for reasonableness as between them, appears at first
sight to go against the general requirement of universality or univer-
salisability in rulings upon the law and its interpretation.6 3 Obviously,
60 Id at 201. See also Warner v. Metropolitan Police Comm'r, [1968] 2 All E.R.
356 (noting Lord Reid's dicta).
61 Collins v. Collins, [1964] App. Gas. 644, 660 (appeal taken from Eng.).
62 Livingstone-Stallard v. Livingstone-Stallard, [1974] Fam. 47, 54 (quoting Jus-
tice Dunn) (cited with approval by LordJustice Roskill in O'Neill v. O'Neill, [1975] 3
All E.R. 289, 295) (emphasis added).
63 For a discussion of the requirements of universality in legal rulings, see MAC-
CoRMicK, supra note 52, at 71-86. On the point of present difficulty, it is worth re-
membering that, as R. M. Hare argues, a principle may be universal even though it
contains reference to "bound variables." See R.M. HAIRE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS,
METHOD, AND POINT 140 (1981). An example would be if we were to say that "every
married person ought to treat his or her spouse in a way that his or her spouse finds
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there must between each set of marriage partners be a different "per-
sonal equation," so that what is reasonable as between any one pair
may not be reasonable for any other, and we shall lose all view of the
universal in a thicket of particulars. But on reflection, this doubt is
groundless. We may make it a universal rule always to apply an objec-
tive test of reasonableness, for example, in negligence cases (and we
may have good justifications for so doing), and yet make it an equally
universal rule always to apply a subjective test of what is reasonable for
any particular spouse in relation to his partner in matrimonial cases,
having here a sound justification for applying the subjective test, pre-
cisely because of the type of relationship in view in any such case.
What would be objectionable would be to vary the interpretation
of "reasonable" as between subjective and objective within a single
type of case having a single common topic. In public law, the much
criticised war-time case of Liversidge v. Anderson64 ruled that a Minister
might be held to have "reasonable cause to believe" that a person had
hostile origins or associations, and therefore to be acting lawfully in
causing him to be detained under the Defence (General) Regulations,
1939,65 provided only that he honestly believed that he had reason-
able cause for his belief. In this branch of law, there are the most
powerful reasons for treating criteria of reasonableness as being objec-
tive, not subjective. Hence even the special exigencies of wartime can
hardly be pled in aid to justify giving a special subjective interpreta-
tion to that criterion. In fact, the decision in Liversidge has been so
generally disapproved as to be of practically no weight as a precedent.
It is an unjustified exception to a welljustified, general rule for the
interpretation of reasonableness as an objective standard in public
law.66
Let it be remarked again that the legitimate variability as between
objective and subjective grounds of reasonableness, dependent in
turn on variations of topic or of focus of concern, is only one of the
elements of variability in the interpretations which may properly be
given of the criterion or standard of "reasonableness." What the pres-
ent discussion has shown is that "reasonableness" is not itself a first-
order value, but a higher-order value which we exemplify in consider-
ing a balance of first-order, or anyway lower-order values, and coming
to a conclusion about their application. The task of interpretation of
reasonable." See also GREENAWALT, supra note 1, at 141-62 (discussing "The General-
ity of Law").
64 [1942] App. Cas. 206 (appeal taken from Eng.).
65 Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, reg. 18B, § 1.
66 See Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne, [1951] App. Cas. 66, 76-77 (appeal taken from
Eng.).
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"reasonable" in a given context is that of identifying the values, inter-
ests, and the like that are relevant to the given focus of attention. This
in turn depends on the types of situation or relationship that are in
issue, and on a view of the governing principle or rationale of the
branch of law concerned.
IV. WHAT Is REASONABLE, AND Is THIS A QUESTON OF FACT?
It is worth observing at the outset of this Section how strange it
appears on the face of things to call questions of reasonableness ques-
tions of "fact" at all. To conclude in a given case that a person has
acted or decided reasonably or unreasonably is surely to make a value
judgement rather than ajudgement of fact. Yet "questions of fact" are
what Scots lawyers and common lawyers call such judgements. Lord
Denning once said the following about the analogous case of judicial
determination of an employer's duty to take reasonable care for the
safety of his employees:
What is "a proper system of work" is a matter for evidence, not for
the law books. It changes as the conditions of work change. The
standard goes up as men become wiser. It does not stand still as the
law sometimes does.67
It is important that we appreciate Lord Denning's point about the
mutability-through-time of judgements concerning what is proper or
reasonable given changing facts and circumstances. Precautions at
work which were once treated as unusual or extravagant may come to
be accepted as normal and proper. 68 Advances in medical knowledge
may reveal risks in simple procedures such as the administration of
injections, risks avoidable by the taking of new precautions; then the
reasonableness of taking such precautions changes and is governed by
the new state of available knowledge in the profession.69 What can
reasonably be expected of a marriage partner may change with
changes in the social milieu-what husband in the present day could
think unreasonable an expectation that he participate in domestic
chores which even thirty years ago were firmly identified as women's
work?
But that is not the only point to be taken from Lord Denning's
remark. For it reminds us also of two particular features of decision-
making in the common law context. First, we must remember the
67 See Qualcast (Wolverhampton), Ltd. v. Haynes, [1959] App. Cas. 743, 760 (ap-
peal taken from Eng.).
68 See id.; cf. General Cleaning Contractors v. Christmas, [1953] App. Gas. 180
(appeal taken from Eng.).
69 See, e.g., Roe v. Minister of Health, [1954] 2 Q.B. 66.
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division of legal labour that makes judges masters of the law, butjuries
of the facts. It is for the judge to give authoritative guidance on ques-
tions of law and of its interpretation, including interpretations of the
criteria of reasonableness such as were discussed above in Section II.
It is for the jury to decide whether these criteria are satisfied by the
facts of the given case. Most obviously, in a criminal trial, it is for the
judge to explain to the jury that the prosecution must prove its case
"beyond reasonable doubt," and what that means. But it is for the jury
to decide whether that standard of proof has been satisfied in the case
before it.
Secondly, even though (outside the sphere of criminal law) resort
to jury trial is on the decline, the distinction remains between ques-
tions of law and questions of fact on the basis of how these would be
apportioned between judges and juries, even where a professional
judge or judges are deciders of both sorts of question. This has an
obvious bearing on the doctrine of precedent. Later courts and lower
courts are obliged to respect decisions by earlier courts or higher ones
on questions of law (including, therefore, questions as to the proper
interpretation of, for example, criteria of reasonableness). The same
obligatory force, however, does not attach to decisions on the facts of
particular cases, including the question whether, in a given case, a
person acted reasonably.
The latter point was the one most at issue in the case from which
Lord Denning's remarks above were quoted. His argument was aimed
at stressing that a court's judgement as to what is, for example, a
"proper system of work" in all the circumstances of one case does not
constitute a binding precedent of direct applicability to other cases.
Hence the importance of his stress on the possibility that social stan-
dards may change and with them conclusions as to "proper system of
work," "reasonable care," and the like.
These considerations are of importance in understanding why
lawyers include questions about reasonableness as falling within what
they classify as "questions of fact," although they are also in part at
least questions of value. Certainly, on any view they are, as Lord Den-
ning put it, "matters for evidence." We must know in any case what
was done and what was not done, and for what reasons, and what
might otherwise have been done or omitted, and what is normal prac-
tice in such matters, before we can judge the reasonableness of the
actings and omissions in view, Analytically, at least, the process of
judgement is one which has two phases-the phase of discovering
what happened and why, and the phase of appreciating that which
happened in the light of the relevant value-factors.
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In a famous essay,70 John Wisdom once drew attention to what he
took to be a special peculiarity of legal reasoning, in the light of which
it could not be classified either as deductive or as inductive reasoning
in the ordinary sense of these terms, but was in effect sui generis. He
pointed out that the reasoning process in law is not like a chain of
mathematical reasoning, where each step follows from the preceding
one, and where any error at any step invalidates all that follows.
Rather, legal reasoning is a matter of weighing and considering all the
factors which "severally co-operate" in favour of a particular conclu-
sion, and balancing them against the factors which tell against that
conclusion.71 In the end, the conclusion is to be reached rather on a
balance of reasons than by inference from premises to conclusions or
from known to unknown facts. The reasons for a conclusion are com-
monly mutually independent, offering a set of supports for the con-
clusion, so that failure in one of them does not leave the conclusion
unsupported; such reasons are, in Wisdom's vivid phrase, "like the
legs of a chair, not the links of a chain. '72
To accept Wisdom's thesis as a complete account or description
of legal reasoning would, I believe, be to mistake the part for the
whole. But the part to which it applies, and with which his essay ex-
plicitly dealt, is the very part under review at the moment. As to that,
Wisdom captures exactly and vividly the way in which we must bring a
plurality of factors together into consideration when, as a "matter for
evidence," we seek to pass judgement upon the reasonableness of
some decision, or action, or omission, or choice to rely upon advice,
or contractual provision, or matrimonial expectation, or whatever.
What is necessary now is, however, to move beyond general descrip-
tion of the process to the scrutiny of particular cases in a variety of
fields to see if we can establish how exactly the process of "weighing"
or "balancing" the various factors of judgement may be understood.
We may start with problems of public law. How do we find judges
evaluating the "reasonableness" of public authorities' decisions? The
answer here seems to be that the grounds for the decision made have
to be evaluated for their relevancy to the making of the decision in
the light of the aims and purposes of a statutory power of decision-
making. Thus in Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture73 the Minister had
refused to exercise his statutory power to appoint a committee to in-
70 John Wisdom, Gods, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, 1944-1945,
at 185, reprinted inJOHN WISDOM, PHILOSOPHY AND PsYcHo-ANALYsIS 149-68 (1957).
71 WISDOM, supra note 70, at 157.
72 Id.
73 [1968] App. Cas. 997 (appeal taken from Eng.).
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vestigate complaints made by members of the Milk Marketing Board
about the scheme established for fixing the price of milk. Each of the
reasons stated by the Minister was reviewed in terms of its relevance to
the statutory milk marketing scheme. The House of Lords concluded
that the Minister's stated reasons showed his refusal to have been mo-
tivated by irrelevant reasons and thus to have been calculated to frus-
trate rather than promote the purposes of the legislation. On that
ground, the Minister was ordered "to consider the complaint of the
appellants according to law." Such a case has to be distinguished from
one in which a public authority's decision is based on a genuine re-
view of relevant grounds for decision and is not motivated by any irrel-
evant grounds, but is complained against on the ground of having
come to a false judgement on the relative merits of relevant reasons
for and against a particular course of action. Within this area, the
public authority's conclusion as to what is right or reasonable must be
taken as conclusive.74
In such cases on the relevancy of grounds of decision, it obviously
makes sense to say that among the plurality of grounds offered, each
may "severally co-operate" with every other in favour of the decision
made and as showing it to be relevantly grounded. Yet the attack
made upon the decision will seek to isolate some one or more of the
grounds as having been both irrelevant and determinative of the deci-
sion. If a dominant motive for a decision is a wrong one, that may be
fatal to it even though there are, or might be, perfectly acceptable
other reasons for the same decision.75 While "reasonableness" may
arise from a plurality of grounds, it may be that the presence of a
single improper or irrelevant consideration is sufficient to "tilt the bal-
ance" the other way.
The same may apply in relation to other legal topics of "reasona-
bleness." For example, in tort law, the central question is commonly
whether some harm suffered by the plaintiff resulted from a want of
"reasonable care" on the defendant's part. It is worth remembering
that in such cases the burden rests upon the plaintiff to show that the
defendant did not take reasonable care. So for example, it must be
proved both that harm was suffered by the plaintiff as a result of some
act or event or state of affairs within the defendant's control and that
it was open to the defendant to have taken some precaution which
would have prevented the occurrence of the harm. In one case, a bus
74 See Secretary of State for Educ. & Science v. Tameside Metro. Borough Coun-
cil, [1977] App. Cas. 1014 (appeal taken from Eng.).
75 The case of Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, [1968] App. Cas. 997 (appeal
taken from Eng.), itself indicates this point.
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passenger fell out of the open door of a bus while making his way
towards the door with a view to alighting at the next stop.76 It was
argued that this accident need not have happened if either the door
had been kept closed or a central pillar (in addition to nine other
hand holds) had been provided as a handhold on the bus platform.77
Failure to take one or other such precaution, it was contended,
amounted to a failure to take reasonable care. As against this, it was
shown that (a) buses of this type had been run for several years with-
out such accident occurring, and that (b) either of the possible pre-
cautions would have required great expense and caused great
inconvenience in the use of the buses.78 So the precaution, lack of
which was alleged to be unreasonable, was in the House of Lords'
view, one which it was reasonable not to take given the value to be set
on general convenience in the use of the buses and the low degree of
risk established by the evidence. By contrast, where window-cleaning
employers failed to require employees to take any precautions in
cleaning windows while balancing on window ledges, this was held to
be unreasonable even though it had been shown that two of the possi-
ble safety systems would be impracticable in some cases, and prohibi-
tively costly in others. Provided there was some precaution that could
practicably be taken to diminish the obviously high risk of falling from
window ledges, it was unreasonable not to take it.79
That in such cases there is necessarily a weighing or balancing of
factors for and against is very obvious, and well illustrated by Bolton v.
Stone.80 A woman walking along a street outside a cricket ground was
injured by a cricket ball struck out of the ground by a' batsman. Such
76 See Wyngrove's Curator Bonis v. Scottish Omnibuses, Ltd., 1966 Sess. Cas.
(H.L.) 47. Nowadays, buses have automatically opening and closing doors, and the
standard of "reasonable precautions" for passengers' safety has surely risen, in the
manner mentioned in connection with Lord Denning's opinion. See supra note 67
and accompanying text.
77 See Wyngrove, 1966 Sess. Cas. at 52.
78 See id. at 85.
79 See General Cleaning Contractors v. Christmas, [1953] App. Cas. 180 (appeal
taken from Eng.). A more up-to-date example, this one concerning duties of disclo-
sure in an insurance context, is the following holding ofJustice Potter: "[I] t was the
duty of PUM as prudent managing agents seeking unlimited protection... to con-
sider with care what required to be disclosed to a prospective reinsurer.., in particu-
lar, the mounting claims for asbestosis and DES which were the reason why the
reinsurance was sought in the first place. Further, that duty extended to disclosure of
facts which were arguably material so as to avoid unnecessary risk of avoidance." Aiken v.
Stewart Wrightson Members' Agency, [1995] 3 All E.R. 449, 481 (quoting Justice
Potter).
80 [1951] App. Cas. 850 (appeal taken from Eng.).
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mighty hits of the ball were naturally rare, but did happen from time
to time. To guard against the risk of injury to pedestrians, it would
have been necessary to erect a fence of some height all around the
ground. It was argued that failure to take this precaution amounted
to a breach of duty on the part of the cricket club..
Those being the facts, a breach of duty has taken place if they show
the appellants guilty of a failure to take reasonable care to prevent
the accident. One may phrase it as "reasonable care" or "ordinary
care" or "proper care"-all these phrases are to be found in deci-
sions of authority-but the fact remains that, unless there has been
something which a reasonable man would blame as falling beneath
the standard of conduct that he would set for himself or require of
his neighbour, there has been no breach of legal duty. And here, I
think, the respondent's case breaks down. It seems to me that a
reasonable man, taking account of the chances against an accident
happening, would not have felt himself called upon either to aban-
don the use of the ground for cricket or to increase the height of
his surrounding fences. He would have done what the appellants
did: in other words, he would have done nothing.81
Here we have to set, on the one hand, the (implicit) value to be at-
tached to the traditional English game of cricket, the cost of fencing
the ground, and the low risk of pedestrians actually being hit against,
on the other hand, the value of personal security from bodily injury.
The House of Lords concluded that the former values in this case
overrode the latter. The plaintiff had pointed to a failure of precau-
tions-but this, failure was not evaluated as unreasonable set against
the other values at stake. Likewise, in cases where risks are taken in
situations of emergency, the degree of risk which it is held reasonable
to take is greater than in ordinary circumstances. If you are trying to
save lives, you may reasonably have to take some quite serious risks in
doing so.
In all such cases, it is up to one party to show a failure of reasona-
bleness and identify the alleged lack of reasonable care; but then the
other party counters this by showing the difficulty or impracticality or
excessive costliness in terms of relevant values of that which it is al-
81 Id. at 868. For a criticism of this line of reasoning, on the ground that in fact
the cricket club and other cricket clubs would have had to pay for insurance, not pay
for new fencing, had the decision gone the other way, see P. S. Am'AH, AcCIDENTS
COMPENSATION AND THE LAw 467-69 (1970). The most recent edition of Atiyah's
book drops this point, see PETER CANE, AT=AH's ACCIDENTS COMPENSATION AND THE
LAw (5th ed. 1993), but retains the discussion concerning the weighing of rival val-
ues, see id at 35. See also id at 150 (suggesting that there might be liability here
without negligence).
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leged he should have done. It is in that process of countering an alle-
gation of failure to do what is reasonable that we find recourse to
Wisdom's plurality of grounds severally co-operating to cancel out the
allegation.
The same applies in other spheres, for example the contractual
or proprietary. We saw earlier how in American Book Co., Justice
Greenfield ruled that relevant criteria for reasonable objection to a
subtenant of leased property must be "objective."8 2 That being so, on
the facts of the particular case it was fatal to the landlord's objection
that the proposed subtenant of the premises did satisfy all the objec-
tive criteria under scrutiny. The substantial ground of objection, the
subjective hostility of the landlord to the subtenant's activities as an
advocate of contraception, fell to be dismissed as an unreasonable
objection.
We can find similar reasoning in the cases on contracts in re-
straint of trade; at common law, contractual provisions which fetter a
person's freedom to trade as he wishes are illegal except where they
constitute a reasonable protection for the other party and are reason-
able in the public interest. In Dumbarton Steamboat Co. v. MacFarlane,8s
the pursuers had bought over the carriers' business of the defender
and his partner, who were to be employed by the pursuer company
and who undertook to procure for the company the benefit of their
own previous business and also not to "carry on or be concerned in
any separate business of a like or similar kind in the United Kingdom"
for a period of ten years.84 Three years after the agreement had been
made, the defender was dismissed by the company and then recom-
menced business as a carrier in the Dumbarton area.85 It was estab-
lished that in his new business he had been actively canvassing former
customers of himself and of the company, in breach of his agreement.
Upon this point, the pursuers were granted an interdict to prevent
him from infringing a provision perfectly reasonable in the context of
the sale of a business and its goodwill.8 6 By contrast, on the other
point, Lord Moncrieff said:
[A]s the business which was sold by the defender to the pursuers
was of a very limited character, the restriction which would prevent
him from carrying on the business of carrier in any part of the
United Kingdom, however remote from Dumbarton and uncon-
82 See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
83 1 Fr. 993 (1899).
84 IdL at 994.
85 See id.
86 See id. at 995.
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nected with the Dumbarton trade, is excessive, and should not re-
ceive effect- 7
In the matrimonial cases, where one of the modem grounds for di-
vorce as following from irretrievable breakdown of marriage is "that
the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot
reasonably be expected to live with the respondent,"8 8 the criteria of
what is reasonable, as we saw earlier, are subjective rather than objec-
tive. But there is a matter of weighing the evidence, and of seeing
whether things have been done by one to another which go beyond
what that person with his character can reasonably accept. For this
purpose, the petitioner must establish something seriously objectiona-
ble to himself about the other spouse's behaviour. Hence the case put
by the petitioner husband in Pheasant v. Pheasant was necessarily an
insufficient one, as appears from Justice Ormrod's summary of it:
The husband was unable to establish, . . anything which could be
regarded as a serious criticism of the wife's conduct or behaviour.
His case, quite simply is that she has not been able to give him the
spontaneous, demonstrative affection which he says that his nature
demands and for which he craves. In these circumstances he says
that it is impossible for him to live with the wife any longer and that
in consequence he cannot reasonably be expected to live with
her.8 9
There is a sharp contrast between such a case and that of O'Neill v.
O'NeilL9° After eighteen years of somewhat mobile married life, the
husband having been an airline pilot and having been forced to retire
for medical reasons, the O'Neills bought an apartment in which to
settle down. For two years the husband worked single-handed on try-
ing to renovate the flat, a process which involved the removal of the
lavatory door and the lifting of most of the floorboards in the house.
His wife found this intolerable due to the loss of privacy and the im-
possibility of having guests at home in the circumstances. Eventually
she left with the two children of the marriage. The husband re-
sponded by writing her a letter casting doubt on the legitimacy of the
children. She petitioned for divorce on the ground of his behaviour
having been such that she could not reasonably be expected to live
with him. The husband argued that her objection was in effect to his
character rather than to his behaviour. But the Court of Appeal re-
87 ML at 998.
88 Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, ch.18, § 1(2)(b); Divorce (Scotland) Act, 1976,
ch. 39, § 1(2)(b).
89 [1972] 1 All E.R. 587, 588.
90 [1975] 3 All E.R. 289.
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jected this. As a woman who had for long desired a settled home with
neighbours and friends, Mrs. O'Neill had much to object to in her
husband's conduct in trying to renovate the house, on top of which
there was the unacceptable act of suggesting that the children were
illegitimate. What is at issue is whether in the behaviour or conduct of
one spouse there has been something objectionable to the other,
which can be alleged to go beyond what it is reasonable for him to
tolerate. Whether it does go beyond that limit is to be assessed in the
light of allegedly counteracting considerations advanced by that
other.
That is, in sum, the dialectic of debate upon the reasonable.
Starting from a view, most probably an open-ended or nonexclusive
view as to the criteria or factors relevant to a given topic, an allegation
must be made as to one or more failures under one or more criteria
or factors. It is then for the other side to counter this alleged failure
by reference to positive values under the same or other criteria or
factors. In this sense the final judgement is one attained by "weigh-
ing" and "balancing" to decide whether, all things considered, they
constitute not merely good and relevant reasons in themselves for
what was done, but adequate or sufficient reasons for so doing even in
the presence of the identified adverse factors.
It may seem unsatisfactory that at the end of the day, even after
examining, or at least sketching, a set of more or less random exam-
ples of such judgements from various branches of the law having quite
different foci of concern, we have to rest with the metaphor of "weigh-
ing" or "balancing" reasons pro and contra. For this is a metaphor.
Reasons do not have weights as material objects do. To say that some
reasons for action or value-factors bearing on action "outweigh"
others is almost to restate the initial problem rather than to solve it.
For at best we ascribe greater or less weight to some reasons or factors
than others, and the question is what are the grounds of such
ascription.
Perhaps the answer to this question is best given by referring back
to the "procedural" aspect of reasoning. What is required is attention
to, and deliberation over, the relative human importance of the differ-
ent factors that enter judgement in any given case. Wherein lies rela-
tive importance? One important thing is how much people care
about one thing rather than another, and surely there is no reason to
leave out sense and sentiment, nor the actual psychological make-up
of real people.91 But bringing one's reflections beyond raw feeling
91 Heidi Li Feldman's article is an important and path-breaking work. See Feld-
man, supra note 17. She brings to our attention the empirical psychological work of
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and into the realm of the reasonable calls for something like Adam
Smith's "impartial spectator" procedure considered above.92 A mea-
sure of weight is found in the sympathetic or empathetic response of
the deliberator to the feelings of persons involved, after making ad-
justments for impartiality and adequate information. If this is so,
there is bound to be for each of us an element of the subjective in
every one of our best efforts at pure objectivity. This conclusion, I
suspect, merely replicates that of Kent Greenawalt.
Daniel Kahneman and others to show how far the construct of the "reasonable man"
can be rooted in ordinary people's attitudes to risk and risk-taking, and why this dif-
fers from the hypotheses built into rational choice theory. Feldman is now embarked
on an "Ethico-Psychological" project, aimed at further fleshing out the evaluative as
well as descriptive components of "reasonableness." The present work is confessedly
longer on ethics and shorter on psychology, but I am sure Feldman is right concern-
ing the need to incorporate findings such as Kahneman's.
92 See SMrrH, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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